Senate Threatens to Usurp Presidency, Constitution, and Will of the People

... We have a federal Constitution. Every federal legislator and judge promises, by oath, not to act contrary to that Constitution.

Every federal judge must promise this: “I…solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon me…under the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

Every federal legislator must promise this: “I…solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter.”

... Democrats, Never-Trump Republicans — Congress-Members, many federal judges, Trump-administration-members — and too many lunatic pundits, “journalists,” and common folk have been hell-bent toward (a) destroying Trump and any populist ideas associated with him and (b) instituting a regime of anti-utilitarian lunacy in which freaks are normal and psychopathic greed is the moral code.

That bent is anathema to the federal Constitution’s Preamble. In the election-fraud-denial aspect of the Trump impeachment, that bent is anathema also to several of the federal Constitution’s provisions that are fundamental to realization of the purpose abstracted in the Constitution’s Preamble.

Where that bent manifests in Congress-Members and federal Judges, it reflects a flagrant dishonor of magnitude rarely witnessed in the history of nations. It is criminal disloyalty. It is criminally conspiratorial because increasingly it occurs with impunity.

The truly grave matter is not the Senate’s treatment of Trump — whether particularly the Senate tries Trump and holds Trump guilty. Such result would be unfair to Trump — bar, illegally and unjustly, his holding any “Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States,” defame him unjustly and horrendously, harm him economically for wrong cause, and not-unlikely endanger him otherwise. Accordingly, the pro-impeachment Senators would deserve severest rebuke.

The core and overarching matter the government’s and the political parties’ quasi-seditious/quasi-treasonous trashing of our Constitution — “quasi-seditious/quasi-treasonous,” because not involving or suggesting use of force or involving or aiding an “enemy” of the U.S. [Compare 18 U.S. Code §§ 2381- 2386 & U.S. Constitution Article III § 3 clause 1].[3]

That is why I write this article. That is why I shall show the dishonor — and illegality — of the House’s delivering articles of impeachment to the Senate and the Senate’s trying Trump after Trump’s term has ended and he has left Office. And that is why I shall show that if federal judges refuse to declare such Congressional action unconstitutional, those federal judges will have violated the Constitution and their oaths and committed impeachable offenses."

I. Senate “precedent” cannot govern whether the Senate can try Trump after his term has ended and he has left Office

Some “scholars” argue that the Senate may adjudge the second Trump impeachment after Trump is not in Office (after his Presidency term has ended and he has vacated Office). The arguments cite “precedents,” which I discuss below. But precedent-reliance is error.

The Senate is not a common law court. The Senate cannot rely on or be bound by the Senate’s previous impeachment-trial judgments, as if those decisions were judicial “precedent.” In impeachment trials, the Senate’s jurisdiction depends directly and solely on these Article I § 3 provisions:


In the Article I § 3 clause 7 phrase “removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office…,” the conjunction is not “or,” but “and.” Hence, if the Senate adjudges an impeached Officer guilty of the charge presented by articles of impeachment, the Senate may remove the Officer from Office AND disqualify him from holding and enjoying “any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” The Senate cannot disqualify the impeached Officer from holding and enjoying “any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States” unless the Senate removes him from Office.

Therefore, the case must be one in which the impeached official can be removed from office. And such case does not obtain where the Officer does not hold, or remain in, Office.

Were the critical conjunction “or,” not “and,” the Senate could choose either (a) to remove an impeached Officer from Office or (b) to disqualify him from holding and enjoying “any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States” [or both (a) and (b), if  the impeached Officer remained in Office when the Senate tried him]. Hence, if the critical conjunction were “or,” even if an impeached Officer were not in Office, the Senate could disqualify him from holding and enjoying “any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.” But the critical Article I § 3 clause 7 conjunction is not “or.” It is “and.”

Yet, suppose, in impeachment trials, the Senate were like a common law court — bound by, or entitled to rely on, Senate impeachment trial “precedent.” Still, never has the Senate held that the Senate can try an impeached Officer who is not in Office at the time of trial.

II. No Congressional “precedent” could establish that the Senate can try Trump after his term has ended and he has left Office; but, rather, prior cases indicate the contrary

The first federal impeachment case was the 1798 impeachment of U.S. Senator William Blount. The Senate had expelled Blount for “high misdemeanor.” Blount was ordered to appear before a Senate select committee. He refused. A Senate impeachment trial began without him. The trial never reached the merits. The Senate dismissed the impeachment because the Senate lacked jurisdiction since Blount was not in Office at the time the impeachment articles reached the Senate for trial: Blount had been expelled from the Senate.

Some “scholars” cite the 1827 case of Vice President John C. Calhoun. Calhoun’s enemies were rumoring that Calhoun engaged in financial misconduct when, earlier, he was Secretary of War. Though Calhoun had left the Office of Secretary of War and had become Vice President, Calhoun begged the House to impeach him concerning whether he abused his Office when he was Secretary of War. Calhoun wanted a forum and process in which he could refute the rumors.

The House investigated Calhoun and cleared him. But he was not impeached. Hence, the Calhoun case does not support the argument that the Senate can try an Officer after he has left Office.

Some “scholars” cite also the 1846 case of Daniel Webster. Webster was President Tyler’s Secretary of State. Three years after he left the post (and four years before he returned to it), Webster was accused of using federal funds improperly while he was Secretary of State (under Tyler). Some House members thought impeachment would be proper means of testing the accusations.

During House’s debates of Webster’s case, John Quincy Adams asserted that the House could impeach a person after he left Office. Adams’s assertion is oft-cited as “proof “ of the truth of its content. But impeachment did not occur. Hence the case, and Adams’s assertion, prove naught but the fact that some House members thought impeachment was possible though Webster had left Office.

Some “scholars” cite also the 1870 case of Benjamin Franklin Whittemore and John Deweese. The House censured Whittemore and Deweese for selling commissions to the Naval Academy while Whittemore and Deweese were House-Members — despite Whittemore and Deweese were no longer Members of the House. The House debated whether the House could impeach Whittemore and Deweese. But impeachment did not issue — partly because one House-Member thought that the Blount case [see above] had established that Congress-Members could not be impeached.[4]

Some “scholars” cite the 1873 case of Judge Mark Delahay. House-Members alleged that Delahay’s personal habits rendered him unfit for judicial office: he was intoxicated both on the bench and off. Delahay resigned before the House could draft accusation-specific, formal articles of impeachment and deliver them to the Senate for trial. So, Delahay was neither formally impeached nor submitted to Senate trial. Hence, the case cannot be precedent.

In the 1876 case of Secretary of War William Belknap, the House impeached Belknap after he had resigned his Office. The Senate’s minority insisted the Senate lacked jurisdiction because Belknap had resigned his Office. For that reason the minority voted to acquit. Belknap was acquitted.

Though the Senate’s simple majority argued that the Senate had jurisdiction and pressed the case to judgment, that argument is not precedent. The argument was not upheld by two-thirds vote. Belknap was acquitted. And Belknap’s Office had not ended (albeit Belknap had left Office). Belknap had resigned, and, therefore, could have continued holding Office.

A more interesting case is the 1912 impeachment of Judge Robert Archbald. At the time of his impeachment and Senate trial, Archbald was an Article III judge of the U.S. Commerce Court, an Article III court.[3]

But of the twelve articles of impeachment, six articles addressed alleged misconduct committed while Archbald was a judge of a U.S. District Court, another Article III court. Still, the Archbald case is not precedent for the proposition that the Senate can try an Officer’s impeachment after the Officer has left office.

Six impeachment charges related to alleged misconduct Archbald committed while holding the Office of a U.S. Commerce Court judge. While Archbald was still a Commerce Court judge, Archbald was convicted of two of those six charges. Archbald was acquitted from all six impeachment charges that related to his conduct occurring while he was a District Court judge.

Archbald had been elevated from a U.S. District Court judgeship to another federal “Article III” judgeship, a Commerce Court judgeship, when, and from which, the Senate removed him. Archbald’s two federal judgeships can be treated as one “office” — for impeachment and Senate trial purposes — for several reasons:


Commerce Court judges heard claims arising from orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Commerce Court judges rendered judicial review of such orders. So, effectively, Commerce Court judges acted as hybrid trial-court/appellate-court judges. [The Commerce Court was abolished one year after Archbald was removed from that court. In 1982, the “Federal Circuit” Court of Appeals was given jurisdiction like, but broader than, that had by the Commerce Court.]

A federal District Court judge, federal Court of Appeals judge, or any other federal “Article III judge” holds office for life, unless impeached and removed for bad “behaviour.” [Compare endnote 5 (infra) & U.S. Constitution Article III § 1 sentence 2 (quoted infra) & U.S. Constitution Article II § 4 (quoted supra)]. So, even after elevated from his District Court judgeship, Archbald continued to hold the same Office — the Office of an Article III judge. An Article III judge is an Article III judge — not only a judge of a specific Article III federal court.

So, Archbald had not left office — U.S. Constitution Article III judicial office — when, and from which, the Senate removed him, even if (as was not true) the Senate had removed him partly because of misconduct he committed while a U.S. District Court judge.

One may question whether federal Article III judges’ so-called “impeachments” rest solely, or even partly, on the power the Constitution’s Article II § 4 assigns to the House.

U.S. Constitution Article III § 1 sentence 2 provides: “The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished….” [See also endnote 5 (infra).] Since the Article III judge-removal standard is breach of good behavior, federal judge impeachment/removal seems a process somewhat, or materially, distinct from the process of impeaching and removing other “civil Officers” — for “Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors” [U.S. Constitution Article II § 4].

Hence, for reason of such distinction, the Archbald case may be specially not precedent for impeachments and Senate trials of Presidents, Vice Presidents, and other non-judicial civil Officers.

The ultimate conclusion must be that, ‘”as a matter of law,” the Senate cannot try an impeachment of a President, Vice President, or other federal civil Officer (except, perhaps, an Article III judge) whose Office’s term has ended and who has thus left Office. The Senate will violate the Constitution and act unlawfully unless the Senate refuses to try Trump and dismisses the articles of impeachment for lack of Senate jurisdiction — because Trumps term has expired and he has vacated Office.

III. The federal Constitution empowers a federal court to declare unconstitutional the Senate’s trying an ex-President after his term has ended and he has vacated Office; and such declaration would not usurp a power of Congress or trespass upon Congressional authority

Suppose, despite Trump’s Office has ended and Trump has vacated the Office of the Presidency, the Senate tries Trump and disqualifies him from holding and enjoying “any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States.”

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), established that the federal judiciary possesses the sole power to determine conclusively what the law is — what is the law of the land, including the “law” of the federal Constitution:. “It is emphatically the duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is.” [Idem at p.4.]

Respecting whether the House can impeach an ex-President and the Senate try him after his Office has ended and he has vacated it, the threshold, jurisdictional matter is purely one of constitutional law — purely the meanings of certain terms of the federal Constitution. Hence, a federal court would not usurp Congress’s power or invade the province of the Congress if the court issued a declaratory judgement determining that matter in Trump’s case.

Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (in which I wrote part of the winning brief). In the Powell case, Petitioner Adam Clayton Powell had been duly elected to the House of Representatives, 90th Congress. He was denied his seat by House Resolution No. 278. The Resolution was premised on charges that Powell had misappropriated public funds and abused the process of the New York courts.

Petitioner Powell (and certain voters) brought federal District Court suit for injunctive, mandatory, and declaratory relief. Respondents were certain named House members and the Speaker, Clerk, Sergeant at Arms, and Doorkeeper of the House. The suit’s core and fundamental allegation was that the Resolution violated U.S. Constitution Article I § 2 clauses 1 & 2.

U.S. Constitution Article I § 2 clause 1 provides (in apparently mandatory terms) that House members be elected by the people of each State. Article I § 2 clause 2 sets the qualifications of House-membership — age, citizenship, and residence — all satisfied by Powell.

Powell claimed that those Article I § 2 qualification-requirements were exclusive, that the House Clerk threatened (unlawfully) to refuse to perform the service to which Powell was entitled as a duly elected Congressman, that the Sergeant at Arms refused (unlawfully) to pay Powell’s salary, and that the Doorkeeper threatened (unlawfully) to deny Powell admission to the House chamber.

The Supreme Court held, inter alia, thus:

Although the Speech and Debate Clause (Article I, Section 6, clause 1) bars judicial action against respondent Congress-Members for statements (including votes) rendered in Congressional proceedings, that clause does not bar action against Congressional employees charged with unconstitutional activity — despite the employees act pursuant to express orders of the House (or Senate) — and it does not preclude judicial review of the constitutionality of the underlying legislative decision. [395 U.S. at 501-506.]

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioners’ action. [395 U.S. at 512-516.] The case is one “arising under” the Constitution per Article III, since petitioners’ claims will be sustained if a federal court gives the pertinent Constitution provisions one construction and will be defeated if it gives those provisions another construction. [395 U.S. at 513-514.]

The litigation was justiciable also because


In judging the qualifications of its members under Article I § 5, Congress is limited to the standing qualifications expressly prescribed by the Constitution. [395 U.S. at 550.]

Just so, the case did not involve a “political question” [395 U.S. at 518-549.][6]  — because


If Trump — or, e.g., a Senator — sought declaratory judgment of whether the Senate lacks power of trying Trump now, after his Office ended and he vacated it, the law and jurisdictional facts would be near-perfectly analogous to those of Powell v. McCormack. In the Trump impeachment trial case, the legal matter favors Trump more than did the legal matters in Powell v. McCormack (supra).

In the Trump impeachment trial case the matter is the proper construction of U.S. Constitution Article I § 3 clause 7 (quoted supra). A declaratory judgment would not attack the Senate or a Senator — or even a House-Member who prosecutes the impeachment. Rather, a declaratory judgment would determine only whether Article I § 3 clause 7 empowers the Senate to try and impose an Article I § 3 clause 7 penalty on Trump despite his Office has ended and he has vacated it.

The case would not present a “political question.” The case would “arise under” the Constitution per Article III, since petitioners’ claims will be sustained if a federal court gives Article I § 3 clause 7 one construction but defeated if it gives that provision another construction. Per a “textually demonstrable” limitation of the Senate’s power of punishing an impeached President, the Court could decide “as a [pure] matter of law” whether the Senate has jurisdiction to try impeachment of an ex-President after his Office has ended and he has vacated it.

The case would not be merely “an occasion” where “our system of government requires a federal court to interpret the Constitution differently from how other branches interpret it.” It would epitomize necessity of the federal judiciary’s acting to protect our government’s constitutional organization from one government-branch’s becoming dictatorial — usurping the Presidency, the Will of the People, and the government-organization and political prescriptions of the Constitution.

Nor would the case involve a federal court’s entering a “potentially embarrassing confrontation” of the Senate. If the Senate were embarrassed, the Senate would have embarrassed itself by pursuing a grave-effect-threatening, flagrantly unconstitutional defamatory and otherwise grievously harmful punishment of a duly elected President — especially since the Senate would do so for corrupt and nation-destructive, wickedly-pernicious political motive.

The petition could name as respondent(s) the Senate Clerk, the Senate Secretary, or both; and the petition could plead that neither Clerk nor Secretary can call roll to determine presence of Trump trial quorum because the Senate lacks jurisdiction to commence the trial.[8]

The court would not judge or even consider or quote a single word of any Senate debate or of any Senator, or even of a House-member who prosecutes the impeachment.

If the petitioner were a Senator, the core question would be whether, constitutionally, the petitioning Senator, or any Senator, can vote to try an ex-President after his Office has ended and he has vacated it.

And the matter would be only — purely — the meaning of Article I § 3 clause 7 : precisely what power that provision grants Senators, or the Senate, and what limit(s) that power suffers.

Surely, a Trump-supporting Senator, like Senator Josh Hawley, will “suggest the absence of a quorum.” The declaratory judgment petition can be filed, electronically, an instant after such Senator states such quorum-absence suggestion. That Senator may even be named a petitioner.

The petition could request a temporary restraining order issued to the Senate Clerk or Secretary or both — an order restraining the Clerk or Secretary from calling roll. Or the petition could seek solely a declaratory judgment respecting the pertinent limit(s) of the Senate’s Article I § 3 clause 7 power.

If the Clerk or Secretary calls roll and trial begins, the court could determine whether the Senate lacks jurisdiction to proceed with the trial. If the court declares that the Senate lacks jurisdiction, the court would issue declaratory judgment that holds so.

The court could not stop the proceeding. No U.S. Marshall could enter the Senate to force the Senate to halt trial.

But Trump would have a judgment that would invalidate a Senate determination that he (Trump) cannot “hold and enjoy any Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States” [per U.S. Constitution Article I § 3 clause 7]. And such judicial judgment ought (a) militate against any court’s adjudging Trump guilty of sedition or inciting a riot when he gave his 6 January 2021 speech and (b) enable Trump to run again for political office.[9]

 And it would encourage a true, courageous, electable populist to run for the Presidency. And it would accord the “lower” classes — the “common folk” — some rational hope.

I expect, however, that no federal court will permit even preliminary consideration of a petition seeking declaration that the Senate lacks jurisdiction to try Trump’s impeachment. Corruptly, they will insist, contrary to law, that such petition puts a political question or is barred by the separation of powers doctrine or that the petitioner lacks standing for lacking “legally protected interest” or…….[10]

With the federal judiciary’s corrupt or cowardly treatment of legitimate election-result challenges, the federal judiciary has shown it has abnegated its constitutional duty and will incline to commit impeachable offenses to avoid resisting the Elites’ and the Deep State’s subjugation of the People. The Supreme Court has shown that five or more pseudo-aristocrat judges (two Democrats, three or more Republicans) align with the Elites and the Deep State. Dr. Paul Craig Roberts is correct. The People are suffering a revolution wrought by the “Establishment” (of the Elites and the Deep State). (read more)